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Abstract
The Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation between 1963-1966 was an important event 
attracting the attention of politicians and scholars alike as the conflict had threatened the 
long existing relations between the two countries. Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia 
was due to its refusal to accept the formation of the new federation of Malaysia, founded 
on 16th September 1963. Sukarno’s confrontational stand on this had broken the long-
standing sentiments of regional brotherhood or “saudara serumpun” that had nurtured 
between the two countries for many years. The conflict also saw the involvement of major 
powers like the United States (U.S.), Britain, China and Russia in the midst of bipolar 
power struggle between the communist and the anti-communist as part of the ongoing Cold 
War. The three years of confrontation witnessed great attempts at peace efforts by U.S. 
Although U.S. involvement in the conflict was merely as a moderator for both countries it 
was also fueled by its efforts of containment of communism in the Southeast Asian region. 
The U.S. viewed that the conflict should be resolved in the context of “Asian solution” 
as it involved two Asian countries A settlement to the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation 
was finally achieved through the Bangkok Agreement, signed in August 1966. This paper 
discusses the role of U.S. in its attempts at finding an amicable settle to the confrontation in 
the form of “Asian solution.” 
Keywords: Malaysia, Indonesia, Confrontation, United States, Bangkok Treaty.
Introduction
David Easter in his book “Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia 1960-1966” 
considers the Malaysia – Indonesia Confrontation as an ‘undeclared war’. However, most 
scholars agree, this event as the biggest diplomatic conflict that severed ties between the two 
Southeast Asian countries. At the same time, it also got a few super powers such as Britain, 
the U.S., Russia and China involved in the conflict. However compared to Russia and China, 
Britain and the U.S. involvements were more obvious and direct. This was because of the 
U.S. role as South East Asia’s ‘security umbrella’ during the Cold War that period.  As for 
Britain, through her commitment in the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) she 
was responsible for the security of Malaysia. Besides, Britain was an ally of the U.S. in 
the international security strategy scheme especially in conflicts with the communist bloc 
during the Cold War. These two super powers were greatly concerned about the Malaysia-
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Indonesia confrontation as they feared that it would develop into a conflict macro in nature. 
Thus the confrontation became an important issue in these two western allies’ foreign policy 
talks at the time. 
There is much literature on different aspects of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation written 
both by western and Asian scholars. For example, D. Hindley, in his paper on ‘Indonesia’s 
Confrontation with Malaysia: Search for Motives’ has discussed the Indonesian domestic 
political problems as the reason for Sukarno’s expansionist interests towards Malaysia in 
1960s era. Besides that, according to Hindley, the foreign policy objectives of Indonesia 
against Malaysia at that time  was also intended to divert the Indonesians attention from 
the problems of economic recession in Indonesia.1 This is one of the earliest works on 
the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation. Other writers have also discussed the role of major 
powers like the U.S. in its efforts to end the confrontation. 
J.A.C Mackie in his book, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963 – 1966 has 
discussed on the circumtances and the involvement of the great powers, particularly the U.S. 
in its efforts to end the confrontation.2 U.S. involvement was also examined by Kivimaki 
who  stated that U.S. hegemony preceded as a complement to other Western powers in 
Indonesia.3  D. Easter has discussed British participation in the Malaysian-Indonesian conflict 
based on British official records.4 Asian scholars have also written on the confrontation. Nik 
Anuar Nik Mahmud, for example, has written on the role of the British in the conflict based 
on British records5 while M. Kunaselan in his book titled Konfrontasi Malaysia-Indonesia 
1963-1966 has focused on the negotiations between Malaysia and Indonesia to settle the 
dispute.6 This article tries to explain the role of the US and its “Asian Solution” approach in 
the Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation.
The United States’ Approach in the Malaysia-Indonesia Conflict
The Confrontation was the direct outcome of the decision by the Federation of Malaya to 
form a new Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, consisting of, apart from the 
ten states of Malaya, the north Borneo states of Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and Singapore. 
Sukarno viewed the formation of Malaysia as an act of neo-colonialism, a British agenda to 
surround Indonesia. Hence Indonesia launched the “Ganyang Malaysia” (Crush Malaysia) 
campaign because Sukarno viewed the decision to form Malaysia as a challenge to his own 
idea of Greater Indonesia.7
As for the British, they felt the formation of the new federation would better serve the 
region. As stated by Easter:
It was the way for Britain to decolonise in South East Asia but still retain the 
crucial Singapore military base, and to do so on a cheaper, more cost effective 
basis. By securing Singapore base through Malaysia, Britain could maintain 
herself as a global power.8
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Therefore the Confrontation was viewed as being detrimental to British and other super 
power interests in the region. A meeting between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. 
(ANZUS) was held from 16 to 18 October 1963, in Washington D.C. to discuss the 
Indonesian confrontation policy on Malaysia. 9 Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador 
in Washington reminded the members at the meeting that Sukarno practiced expansionist 
policy and wished to dominate South East Asian region. In his view, if Indonesia with the 
help of the Philippines were to cause the new Federation of Malaysia to collapse, Western 
power interests in the region would surely be jeopardised. Based on this consideration, Gore, 
supported by Sir G. Barwick, Australia’s Foreign Minister and Alistair McIntoch, New 
Zealand’s Foreign Secretary believed that Indonesia’s aggression against Malaysia should 
be halted.10 The meeting decided that Australia, New Zealand and Britain would continue 
their commitment to defend Malaysia and even expressed that it was the Commonwealth’s 
main responsibility.11 These countries’ worries were also based on the U.S. intelligence that 
Indonesia was believed to have made covert agreement with China to divide the Southeast 
Asian Region into their respective spheres of influence. The said division included the 
Asia’s mainland, Malaysia and Singapore that would be placed under China’s influence 
with clusters of islands in the region would be under Indonesia’s.12
The Western powers were also very concerned about the power struggle between the 
communist and anti-communist bloc in the region in the Cold War. As such Indonesia 
had to be kept with the western bloc. This became the main factor in influencing the U.S. 
approach towards Indonesia during the Confrontation. Indonesia was crucial to U.S. policy 
in Southeast Asia, especially concerning critical matters of security in Vietnam and Laos. 
At the same time, Indonesia was considered to act as a buffer against communism that was 
proliferating in the region, especially to prevent it from spreading to other countries in the 
Pacific region like Australia and New Zealand. 
However, the main concern of the US was that Indonesia’s anti-imperialistic policies 
were more in line with the anti-west communist bloc. This concern became a dilemma in 
formulating the US policy towards Indonesia. It was felt that Indonesia’s  confrontational 
stand would worsen the US position in the region. In William Bundy’s (U.S. Foreign Policy 
Adviser and Cold War Adviser) memorandum to President Johnson, he said: 
We are on sharp downward curve in US-Indo relations, largely because of 
the continued threat to “crush” Malaysia and our necessary opposition to 
it. Sukarno has now adopted a far more overtly anti-US line, which makes 
holding up further aid, essential. At the same time, the very fact that we’re 
on a slippery slope makes it all more important not to burn all our bridges to 
Indonesia: (1) with Vietnam and Laos already on our Southeast Asia plate, we 
can ill-afford a major crisis with Indonesia too just now;...13
U.S. policy towards Indonesia was also determined by the country’s advantage of having 
100 million people, the most populous in Southeast Asia and the fifth in the world. The U.S. 
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viewed that it would be a disaster if Indonesia fell to the communists. The sheer number 
of people in the country supporting communism would give it strength to oppose the anti-
communist West. Therefore the U.S. considered Indonesia as an important platform to 
counter- balance the strength of the communist power in Southeast Asia if the country were 
to have closer ties with it. This is mentioned in U.S. official records:
The programs we have planned are there now because we think they are 
“essential to our national interest.” This is not because we like Sukarno, 
but because we are contending for the long-range future of a country of 
100 million with great resources in a strategic location.14
Yet, the U.S. approach towards Indonesia was actually driven by other factors too. One of 
it was that Washington did not want a chaotic Indonesia as U.S. oil companies operating 
in Indonesia could be declared state-owned. Clearly the two oil companies worth USD500 
million also influenced the U.S. State Department policy on Indonesia. Apart from that, 
there was the US concern over the growing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party 
[CPI Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)], and the country’s inclination to cooperate with 
Beijing.15 
Although Indonesia was crucial to the U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia, U.S. had to 
consider Malaysia’s security as well as it was anti-communist and pro-West. Malaysia was 
also a former British colony, a strong ally of the U.S. Thus the U.S. had to play a balancing 
role in the conflict by taking pragmatic and realistic steps to settle Indonesia-Malaysia 
dispute.
Kennedy’s Involvement and the “Asian Solution”
An effort to improve Malaysia-Indonesia ties was made through the U.S. Attorney General, 
Robert F. Kennedy, who brought a peace mission from the U.S. President. Kennedy’s 
presence was also to ensure the U.S.-Indonesia ties were not affected because of Indonesia’s 
confrontation policy with Malaysia.16 Kennedy was chosen by virtue of the power and 
authority of his name and also because of his active participation in the West Irian issue that 
had ended in Indonesia’s favour. Kennedy also had personal ties with Sukarno by virtue 
of his late brother President Kennedy’s friendship with the Indonesian president.17 In fact, 
according to H.P. Jones, the former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, U.S.-Indonesia ties in 
the mid 1963 was very much influenced by the friendship between the two presidents. The 
choice of Kennedy was partially to persuade the Indonesian President to change his mind 
and partially as a therapeutic value as the Kennedys were still in shock over the tragic 
assassination of John F. Kennedy.18 More importantly, the diplomatic mission borne by 
Kennedy was to ensure that the two countries – Malaysia and Indonesia would be able to 
find a solution to the dispute based on “Asian Solution.”19
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From the U.S. perspective, the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia should be resolved 
within the Asian’s spirit due to the fact that it involved two Asian countries. This solution 
is known as the “Asian Solution”.  The U.S. approach was very important  in view of the 
fact that the two countries involved had a better understanding of their needs in finding 
a solution to the conflict without pressure from any other party including the Western 
powers. Therefore, U.S. felt that, in the context of the Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation, 
the two countries should solve their problems themselves and be assisted by countries only 
acceptable by both countries such as the U.S. or Japan or Thailand.
Thus in this connection, the first step towards finding a solution to the conflict was to 
deal with Sukarno. This was because in the context of Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation, 
Sukarno was the key to the whole problem. The meeting between Kennedy and Sukarno 
was arranged by the Prime Minister of Japan, Hayato Ikeda, in Tokyo. Kennedy arrived in 
Tokyo on 16 January 1964 and in the meeting with Sukarno, he explained the implication 
of Indonesia’s action on Malaysia. Kennedy was worried that if the Confrontation policy 
continued, the American public would oppose any bilateral ties between the two countries 
and Indonesia would stand to lose friends at the international level.20 The U.S. Attorney 
General also stated that the main objective of his visit was to convince Sukarno that his 
military policy on Malaysia would jeopardise U.S.-Indonesia ties, especially in relation to 
their cooperation programs that had existed for some time.21 Kennedy also tried to persuade 
Sukarno to accept the fact that Malaysia was not West Irian and that Indonesia should also 
accept the fact that the U.S. recognised Malaysia’s existence.”22
At this meeting, Kennedy also suggested that Indonesia and Britain withdraw their troops 
concurrently from the border and conduct a Three Leader Summit. Sukarno concurred with 
this suggestion and also agreed to an armistice and a ministerial level talk to be held in 
Bangkok in early February. Kennedy also made it clear that if Sukarno guaranteed the 
withdrawal of his army, he would then fly to Kuala Lumpur and Manila to encourage leaders 
of the two countries to confer as soon as possible in order to find the “Asian Solution.”23  
When Kennedy arrived in Kuala Lumpur on 21 January 1964 and informed Tunku Abdul 
Rahman the Malaysian Premier about this, he agreed to an armistice but had doubts about 
withdrawing troops as he doubted Sukarno’s sincerity. In Tunku’s view, Sukarno signed 
the armistice as a temporary tactical device. He asserted that any armistice should be 
accompanied with withdrawal of Indonesian troops.24
The purpose of Kennedy’s visit was a way for the U.S. to solve the conflict between 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. This was thought to be vital as the Malaysia-
Indonesia conflict involved the Philippines as well since the country too had laid claims 
over Sabah. British Foreign Secretary James Butler’s telegram to the U.S. Secretary of 
State  Dean Rusk, dated 21 January 1964 stated that Kennedy’s attempts to find the ‘Asian 
Solution’ should be supported if the talks could present a way towards peace on a voluntary 
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basis and without Indonesia’s pressure on Malaysia. Butler also stated that they supported 
the establishment of “Maphilindo”, a regional establishment comprising Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. 25
Butler was also worried that if the three governments were left to conduct talks without the 
presence of any Western power, their interests could be left out. He felt the need for western 
representation. In his view, the Indonesia’s main purpose was its opposition towards Anglo 
– Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) and the army base facility in Singapore acquired 
by Britain through the treaty. He was also worried that Indonesia would use this as a pre-
condition for ending the Confrontation and re-establishing ties with Malaysia.
Butler also stated that in the event that happens, it would not only be a problem to Britain, 
it would also involve Western Allies in the region. The worst problem would be that the 
end of Indonesia’s Confrontation would lead to Malaysia being brought under Indonesia’s 
influence which would in turn affect the whole of the Southeast Asia. Thailand would then 
rethink of her support for the Western Allies, affecting situations in Laos and Cambodia and 
probably the situation in Vietnam as well.26
Due to his concerns mentioned above, Butler proposed that there be a general revision 
of policy on Southeast Asia in the meeting between the British Prime Minister and the 
American President due to be held in February 1964. The policy revision should not only 
involve matters pertaining to Britain and Malaysia and the U.S. and Vietnam, it should also 
include other Western Powers in Southeast Asia.27 
Britain hoped that the U.S. commitment could be acquired in the effort towards ending the 
Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. Thus in its talks with Malaysia, Britain had set the 
main issues that Malaysia should be aware of while negotiating with Indonesia. Malaysia 
should refuse any proposition by Indonesia to close the British base in Singapore or to 
conduct another referendum in Sabah and Sarawak.28 Meanwhile, the British ambassador to 
U.S. met President Johnson and requested the U.S. not to impose pressure or conditions for 
Tunku to attend the Asian Summit without acknowledgment from Indonesia. The President 
meanwhile gave assurances that the U.S. strictly opposed Indonesia’s Confrontation policy 
on Malaysia. 
Kennedy’s peace effort visits took 12 days. He ended his visit in a meeting with British 
Prime Minister Douglas Home in London. At this meeting, he convinced Home that Sukarno 
desired a peaceful solution but needed to resolve resistance from PKI and the Indonesian 
army over the question of confrontation with Malaysia. Throughout his effort in finding 
the Asian Solution, Kennedy was criticised for his persuasion-based approach and the U.S. 
tolerance towards for Indonesia. In Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian high-ranking officials had 
also expressed their concern to U.S. Attorney General over Sukarno remaining in power 
indefinitely in Indonesia and also over whether the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) 
would win or lose under Sukarno.29
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Following the Kennedy-Sukarno-Tunku agreement, a conference of Foreign Ministers 
was held in Bangkok on 5-10 February 1964. The Indonesian delegation was led by Dr. 
Subandrio while the Malaysian delegation was led by Tun Abdul Razak. The conference 
that was chaired by Thailand’s Foreign Minister Thanat Koman was also attended by the 
Philippines’ Foreign Secretary Salvador P. Lopez. Important issues discussed were the 
question of armistice and withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Malaysian territories. On 
the question of armistice, an agreement was reached to appoint observers from Thailand to 
supervise the process and they pledged to ensure that the truce would be well-implemented. 
The three Foreign Ministers agreed to place a coordinator in Bangkok to assist Thailand in 
drawing up terms of the cease-fire. They also agreed that if fighting still continued between 
the belligerents, a cease-fire order would be released while waiting for the result of the 
investigation.30
The meeting initially agreed to have the belligerents disarm under the supervision of Thailand 
but this plan failed when Indonesia and Malaysia insisted on different requirements for the 
process. Indonesia was of the opinion that disarming did not mean withdrawing whereas 
Malaysia insisted on withdrawal as a pre-condition to it.31 This confusion arose from the fact 
that the issue was not mentioned in the guiding principles to a cease-fire. Thanat Khoman 
supported Malaysia, asserting that if Indonesia truly wanted to resolve the conflict, the 
withdrawal of troops should be implemented. He questioned Indonesia’s reluctance to a 
withdrawal. Dr. Subandrio replied that the withdrawal of Indonesian army was a political 
question. He also stated the reason why the Malaysian proposition was unacceptable to 
them was that it would besmirch Indonesia’s image and that the issue would be decided 
upon after referring to their President.32
During the negotiation process, in some instances, the Indonesia’s diplomats did not want to 
show that they would concede. For example, Dr. Subandrio requested that the word “retreat” 
contained in the draft declaration be dropped as the delegation believed that the use of the 
word carried the meaning of defeat on the part of Indonesia. In this discussion too Indonesia 
denied that the confrontation with Malaysia was aimed to expand her power. In fact, Dr. 
Subandrio claimed that they wanted to ensure peace and political stability for Indonesia. He 
also alleged that the British had trapped them by enforcing the “divide and rule policy”.33
 
As expected, Indonesia had also demanded that a referendum be held in Sabah and Sarawak. 
The Bangkok Conference clearly showed the many diplomatic tactics than real desire to 
resolve the conflict and it ended without any concrete solution. According to Mackie, this 
negotiation created different perceptions among the countries involved:
The Malaysians felt strongly that is was up to the Indonesians and Filipinos 
to make concessions; they regarded themselves as the aggrieved party who   
was being attacked after having carried out their obligations under the 
Manila Agreement. They should not now be expected to offer concessions 
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in the face of arms aggressions. The Indonesians on the other hand, felt 
they had already made a concession in agreeing to accept cease-fire and 
come to the conference table.34
It was quite clear that the main focus of the Bangkok Conference was the resolution of 
the Malaysian-Indonesian conflict through the withdrawal of Indonesian troops. But as 
stated by Dr. Subandrio, it could affect the image of Indonesia and consequently the U.S. 
suggested that the withdrawal be made without any announcement or publicity.35 But a 
ceasefire agreement was not achieved although the U.S. had expected it to be successful 
and that negotiations could continue. James Forrestal, the U.S. National Security Consular 
Officer in his letter to U.S. Foreign Policy Advisor and Cold War Advisor, Bundy, said that 
he himself did not understand why negotiations to stop the conflict had failed despite efforts 
that had been undertaken at all levels. He recalled that in the context of Malaysia - Indonesia 
strife it had to do with the burden borne by the U.S. in the Vietnam War.36
The failure to end the conflict through the “Asian Solution” had caused the Malaysia-
Indonesia confrontation to drag on and Dr. Subandrio in his declaration to the assembly of 
Indonesian volunteers in West Kalimantan  had stated: “One hundred million armed people 
are behind you” and introduced AM Azahari as Prime Minister of the United Republic of 
North Borneo.37 The failure of the “Asian Solution” approach stated by Indonesian Foreign 
Minister as a ‘magic formula’ (if the goal was successfully achieved), was actually expected, 
due to Indonesia lack of seriousness to resolve the conflicts that were taking place. At the 
same time, Malaysia too did not want to budge from the decisions that had been agreed 
upon in the past. Evidently, The U.S. did not bring peace in the Malaysia-Indonesia conflict 
through the “Asian Solution” approach. It was quite clear that both parties involved failed to 
show a willingness to accept peace terms along quid pro quo. In view of the seriousness of 
Indonesia’s invasion of Malaysian territory, the British  government suggested that Malaysia 
should bring the issue to the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The U.S.  did not object 
to this course of action but admitted that they were worried about the reaction that they 
would get from Sukarno. But Butler had outlined three forms of appropriate action, namely: 
1. Based on Malaysia’s request, the U.S. along with the other Western powers would 
support Malaysia in the Security Council meeting.
2. Sukarno would be issued a warning that if Indonesia failed to pull out troops and 
resume negotiations, the U.S. would give full support to Malaysia.
3. Joining delegation of Asian countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and 
others in Indonesia.38
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. and Britain promised to support Malaysia’s resolutions that 
would be submitted, but was worried about retaliatory acts by Indonesia because of 
their involvement in the war in Vietnam. The U.S. was also worried the Indonesia-
Malaysia conflict could escalate, and this led President Johnson to request H. P. Jones 
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(U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia) to appease Sukarno for of the following reasons: 
The U.S. did not understand why Indonesia was not pleased with them when it was the U.S. 
and no other power that had helped Indonesia since the early years of independence. The 
U.S. President felt offended by Sukarno’s speech on August 17, 1964, as over the years the 
U.S. had protected not only Indonesia from the threat of Communist China but also the rest 
of Southeast Asia. When Indonesia declared “war” against the U.S., it was seen as a victory 
for the Chinese.
1. The U.S. had tried to explain to Sukarno that Indonesia would lose U.S. support if 
they invaded Malaysia and that was why the U.S. had sent the Attorney General 
Kennedy to promote peace. 
2. President Johnson still had hope for a peaceful solution. It was better to negotiate 
than fight. The U.S. also hoped to establish relationships with key countries such 
as Indonesia and important leaders like Sukarno who was thought of to be as 
great as President Kennedy. However, Sukarno should also understand the U.S. 
position should they invade Malaysia.39
On the question of Malaysia’s complaint to the UN Security Council of the United 
Nations, the British expected support from the U.S. as a friend and an ally in Southeast 
Asia and offered assurance that they would not attack Indonesia if the country stop attacks 
on Malaysia. If there was to be any counter-attack it would be very limited. The U.S. 
replied that they could not prevent Malaysia and Britain from taking their case to the UN 
if Indonesian troops wanted to invade Malaysia’s territory, “We can’t stop the UK and 
Malaysia going to the Security Council if 30-man paratroopers’ drop proves to be fact.”40
Malaysia also asked the West to defend her should attempts at the UN Security Council 
failed. For this purpose, the Australian ambassador met Bundy to talk about the role that 
could be played by the ANZUS. The U.S. agreed with this view, but asserted to Australia that 
they should not consider the U.S. to get involved in the event of the escalation of conflict. 
At the same time the U.S. also recognized that it was important for Malaysia to be given 
security guarantees if Indonesia continued to launch attacks. Indonesian soldiers’ incursions 
into Malaysian territory were seen to be leading to large and open hostilities between the 
two countries.41  But the U.S. viewed that British display of their warships in the Straits of 
Sunda as provocative as it was done before the incursions by the Indonesian military. The 
U.S. was also concerned that the British action of displaying their carrier and destroyers 
would cause Sukarno to react with the might of Indonesian military comprising six to seven 
ships, whereas Britain had only three ships in the area to protect Malaysia. According to 
the U.S., this action on the part of the British would fuel Indonesia’s anger and it would 
complicate the confrontation case that would be brought to the UN Security Council.42
 
At the Security Council, the debate on the issue of encroachment received responses from 
many countries. Apart from Britain and the U.S. which certainly supported Malaysia, 
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delegates from Norway had presented a resolution known as the “Norwegian Resolution” 
which expressed disappointment and concern over the conflict that was taking place in 
Southeast Asia. This resolution also specifically referred to the action of the Indonesian 
invasion of Malaysia in September 1964.43 The Norwegian delegate also appealed to the 
parties involved to respect each other’s territorial integrity and prevent violence and resolve 
conflicts through negotiation. But the resolution could not be implemented because the 
Russians had used their veto power against it.44
 
Although the Security Council conference failed to create an impact on the effort to 
resolve the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, it had at least brought the issue to 
the international level. This was evident when members of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) and the Afro-Asia such as India, Morocco and Ivory Coast voiced their 
opposition to Indonesia’s aggression against Malaysia. Indonesia was surprised by the 
opposition, as Sukarno had a strong influence among these nations.  Even though the 
early negotiations had failed, the confrontation between the two countries finally ended 
with the signing of Bangkok Treaty. The treaty was signed on 11 August 1963 by Tun 
Abdul Razak Hussain (Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister) as a Malaysia representative 
and Tun Adam Malik (Indonesian Foreign Minister) as a representative of Indonesia. 
Conclusion
The U.S. involvement in the political circumstances of the Confrontation was driven by 
the Cold War that was taking place in international politics at the time. In keeping with its 
position as a superpower, the U.S. role was to counterbalance the conflict between Malaysia 
and Indonesia. In addition, as the power that oversaw Southeast Asia’s regional security, 
the U.S. policy of containment of communism became an important element in shaping its 
approach in the Malaysian-Indonesian conflict. In fact, the U.S. also tried to minimize, as 
far as possible, military conflict in the region because of the civil war that was going on in 
Vietnam during the same period. Indonesia’s importance in U.S. policy of containment of 
communism is very clear because of the position of Indonesia was considered as the last 
stronghold in the fight against communist expansion in Southeast Asia. U.S. involvement in 
the peace negotiations between Malaysia and Indonesia was due to it being the one Western 
power with close ties with Indonesia. Its involvement in the Malaysian-Indonesian conflict 
was also driven by the it’s close ties with Britain. Ironically, even though the U.S. was 
Britain’s ally, in some circumstances the superpower’s policies on Indonesia contradicted 
British interests. This was evident when the U.S. decided to channel economic aid to 
Indonesia. But for the U.S., the approach was aimed to mitigate Indonesia’s Confrontation 
with Malaysia while at the same time the U.S. was convinced that Malaysian security was 
guaranteed by AMDA. From one angle, the diversity of approaches used by the U.S. on the 
issue of confrontation was a manifestation of a superpower’s cockeyed foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia.
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